



In keeping with the general pattern through-
outtheWest, lumbermanufacturers in west-
ern Oregon and Washington rely heavily on
publicly owned lands for their timber sup-
ply. In 1976,the latestdate forwhich official
data are available, about 22 percentolthe
total sawtimberharvested on commercial
forestlands inthatregion came from Nation-
al Forests managed by the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice. Another 20 percentcame from public-
Iyowned lands managed by theu.s. Bureau
of Land Management and state agencies.
The remaining 58 percentcame from lands
owned by the forest products industry and
other private landowners. In contrast, out-
side the West, public lands account for only
10 percentofthe total annual harvest. Near-
ly all lumber firms operating in western
Oregon and Washington rely on public
lands to some degree for their raw material,
butdependence is especiallygreatforsmall,
non-integrated producers.
The Forest Service sells the rights to harvest
given tracts of standing timber (stumpage)
on National Forests through acompetitive
biddingprocess. The contracts then call for
the winning bidder to harvest the tract with-
in the Iife ofthe contract, usuallyofseveral
years duration toallowforroad construction
and logging. The purchaser pays a small
initial cash outlay but is not required to
makefull paymentuntil thetimber is cut. For
contracts awarded in western Oregon and
Washington before August 1, 1983, pur-
chasers are to pay the original bid price at
time ofharvest. As such, the contracts are
forward contracts. Even with subsequent re-
forms, the contracts require companies to
formulate their bid prices by forecasting the
production costs and selling prices for
lumber and other wood products they ex-
pect to prevail when the timberwill be
harvested.
These forward contracts afford purchasers
certain benefits. They permit firms to secure
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This Letter will describe the contracts and
lumber market conditions that contributed
to the present problem. Itwill show that
whiIe the "forward"contractmethod ofseIl-
ing public timber provides some benefits to
purchasers, italso subjects them to great
uncertainty about the profitabilityofthe
timber under contract. To prevent a possible
recurrence ofthe current problem, public
timber management agencies should con-
sider reformingthe sales system toderivethe
price paid for timber more directly from the
prevailing price for lumber. The discussion
will focus on National Forests in the western
halfofOregon and Washington. The heavy
preponderance ofthe key homebuilding
Douglas-fir species in that region, along
with the absence of a mechanism to adjust
prices downward in contracts awarded be-
fore August 1983, have madethe problem of
uneconomictimberthe most serious there.
To date, the affected companies have re-
ceived extensions ofcontract expiration
dates, but they are pressing forfederal legis-
lation that would dissolve some oftheir
contracts. They argue that the federal gov-
ernment shares responsibility for their diffi-
culties because itaffects housing markets
and controls both the amount oftheir raw
material supply and the methods by which
public timber is sold.
In 1983, the Pacific Northwest lumber
industry moved outofthe depths ofreces-
sion and into recovery. This year, due to the
strength expected in homebuildingand
other lumber markets, lumberproduction
and prices may show further moderate
improvement. Nevertheless, scores offirms
could face financial pressures arising from
the costofraw materials notonlyin 1984but
in the remainder ofthis decade. Those pres-
sures result from the high-cost public timber
undercontractthat is unprofitableto harvest
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acontract with a small outlay ofcapital
"upfront", And they allow the purchaser to
pay only for the actual volumeofuseable,
non-defective raw material found as the
trees designated for harvestare removed and
measured, But the contracts also render the
purchaser vulnerable to changes in lumber
prices. Iflumber prices should rise more
than the firms expected when they formu-
lated their initial bid, they may receive a
larger profitthan they expected. On the
other hand, ifpurchasers expect lumber
prices to rise butthey fall instead, firms may
receive less profitthan they had anticipated
orthey may even suffer losses.
Origins of the problem
Long contracts, requiring little initial capital
and no specific interim payments, encour-
age purchasers to secure and hold large
volumes oftimberwhen they expect pros-
pectivedemand and prices for lumbertorise
sharply. Federal contracts in use in the late
1970s were particularly conducive to such
behavior. Mostcontracts ran from threeto as
much as seven years in duration. Besides the
nominal depositwith bid, the winning bid-
der posted only a performance bond when
the contract was signed and no interim pay-
ments were required until the purchaser cut
the timber, often in the last year ofthe con-
tract. Unlike Forest Service contracts else-
where in the West, they contained no
stumpage rate adjustment clause to adjust
original bid prices upvyard or downward in
response to changes in lumberprices.
Lumber market conditions in the late 1970s
encouraged bidderoptimism. Between
1977 and 1979, producer prices for
Douglas-fir lumber rose at an average
annual rate of16 percent (see chart). Home-
building-by far lumber's largest market-
was booming. Duringthose years, the
numberofnew homes builtannually aver-
aged 1.8 million units, with a near-record
high of2.0 million units being reached in
1978. Demographicfactors suggested that at
least 2 million housing starts per year would
be needed duringthe decadeofthe 1980sto
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meet the requirements ofthe post-World
War II baby boom. Meanwhile, increasing
amounts ofcommercial forestland were set
aside for wilderness purposes.
Expecting that strong productdemand and
tight raw.material supplies would continue
to push lumber prices upward throughout
the 1980s, mills bid frantically for public
timber duringthe late 1970s. On National
Forests in western Oregon and Washington,
the average winning bid price for Douglas-
fir timber nearly doubled between 1977 and
1980 (see chart).
But, instead ofcontinuing upward as expect-
ed, prices for softwood lumberdropped be-
tween 1979 and 1982. For example, the
price of Douglas-fir fell by 31 percent. This
occurred as housing starts plunged down-
ward to only 1.0 million units by 1982 and
lumber consumption also fell in other mar-
kets. When housing starts recovered to 1.7
million units in 1983, lumber prices rose
sharply on an annual basis but failed to re-
gain their 1979 peaks. Prices continue to lag
behind 1979 levels because they showed
renewed weakness in the latter halfof1983
before rising during the first quarter of1984.
The end-result is that many firms currently
hold sizeable volumes ofunprofitable
timber under contracts awarded duringthe
late 1970s.
Magnitudeof the problem
At present, firms hold about 9.5 billion
board feet ofuncuttimber on National
Forests in western Oregon and Washington
in contracts awarded beforeJanuary 1, 1982.
(Contracts awarded thereafter are not a
problem because bid prices fell dramatical-
ly.) The average bid price on the timber
awarded before 1982 is $316 per thousand
board feet. Forest Service and market data
showthat itcurrentlywouldcost an average
operator about $482/thousand board feet to
harvestand deliverthattimberin logform to
the mill (including stumpage), while such
logs would bring an average market price of
only $281 /thousand board feet. At current'WolternOregonondWashlngton -'-;__
award and certain payments mid-way
through the life ofthe contract. The agency
also shortened the term ofnew contracts.
Yvonne levy
To eliminate uncertainty aboutthe profita-
bility of public timber, the Forest Service
would have to sell timber at spot prices
derived directlyfrom contemporaneous fin-
ished lumber prices. Such a system exists in
British Columbia. There, the government
allocates the supply ofpublic timber avail-
able for sale to forest product firms under
long-term contracts. The price it charges for
timber cut in any given year is a residual
value based on the current price of lumber
minus costs ofconversion and a reasonable
margin ofprofit. Its objective is to provide
forest productsfirmswith securetimbersup-
plies at a profitable price, and thereby pro-
mote the growth ofthe industry.
The Forest Service introduced perhaps its
mostimportant reform on August 1, 1983
when it added a stumpage rate adjustment
clause to new contracts in western Oregon
and Washington. The clause permits the bid
price to be increased ordecreased, within
stated limits, in accordance with changes in
lumber prices. The procedure, already in
use on Ndtional Forests elsewhere in the
West, adjusts bid pricestoreflect 50percent
ofany upward change in the lumber price
index and 100 percentofany decline in
lumber prices below a base level. Its pur-
pose is to transfer some ofthe profits and
losses thatwouldotherwise accrue to pur-
chasers during periods ofrising and falling
lumber prices to the federal government,
thereby reducingthe variability in the lum-
ber companies' profits. However, because
the adjustment mechanism is skewed more
to protect buyers from the risk ofdownside
loss than to removeprofits ina rising market,
itwill impart an upward bias on bid prices





finished lumber prices, such contract
holders therefore would incur an average
loss ofabout $201 /thousand board feet on
timber contracts awarded before 1982.
Beyond extending contracts, the Forest Ser-
viceon April 15, 1982, introduced a number
ofnew provisions for future contracts de-
signed to reducetheupward pressureon bid
prices. Those measures, in effect, make it
more expensivefor purchasers to hold tim-
ber under contract. They include, for exam-
ple, requiring a 5 percent cash depositon
thetotal valueofthe bidwithin 30days after
Government.reponse
To givefirms moretimetomeettheirobiiga-
tions, the Forest Service, in May 1980 and
October 1981, extended contracts by one
and two years in programs known as Soft I
and Soft II. Then, on July28,1983,the Secre-
tary ofAgriculture announced that all feder-
al timber sales contracts awarded before
1981 couId be extended for another five
yearswithout paymentof intereston the bid
value ofthe uncuttimberthat would have
been due. Holders ofthose contracts still
argue thatthis proposed"Five-Year MuIti-
Sale Extension Plan" is unworkablebecause
domestic lumber prices are not likelyto rise
sharply enough over the 1984-90 period to
permitthem toharvestthattimberprofitably,
nor is demand likely to be great enough to
combine thatvolume with new Forest Ser-
vice offerings. In February, overone hun-
dred contract holders won a court injunc-
tion temporarily prohibiting the Forest
Service from enforcingthose contractsorthe
February 15, 1984 deadline for submission
ofharvest schedules for the five-year exten-
sion plan.
This analysis does not mean that all ofthe
9.5 billion board feet soldpriorto January
1982 is currently uneconomic to harvest
since the $316/thousand board foot price is
an average. But it does suggest that lumber
prices would have to rise sharply in the
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Loans, Leases and Investments' 2 178,572 - 244 2,547 4.4
Loans and Leases' 6 158,.827 - 65 3,472 6.8
Commercial and Industrial 47,372 130 1,409 9.3
Real estate 59,612 - 30 713 3.7
Loans to Individuals 27,926 123 1,275 14.6
Leases 4,994 0 - 69 - 4.1
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 12,074 - 154 - 433 - 10.5
Other Securities2 7,670 - 26 - 493 - 18.4
Total Deposits 184,539 -3,535 - 6,458 - 10.3
Demand Deposits 43,133 -2,445 - 6,104 - 37.9
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 28,844 -1,152 - 2,487 - 24.2
OtherTransaction Balances4 12,124 - 834 - 651 - 15.5
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 129,281 - 257 296 0.7
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts~Total 39,617 - 477 20 0.1
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 ormore 38,004 202 - 161 - 1.2
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 21,183 2,167 - 1,824 - 24.2
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.s. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
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